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CASE NOTES
NATURAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION-EQUITABLE AP-
PORTIONMENT DEEMED AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
FOR ALLOCATION OF TRANSITORY RESOURCES BE-
TWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES-Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Ore-
gon, 103 S. Ct. 2817 (1983).
Chinook salmon and steelhead trout are among the Pacific-
Northwest's richest natural resources.' The dispute in Idaho ex rel.
Evan v. Oregon' concerned a state's right to an equitable apportion-
ment of these great fish in their migrations through the Columbia-
Snake river system.' The Snake River rises in Wyoming and flows
westward across Idaho, eventually joining the Columbia River in
Washington. From this confluence, the Columbia winds its way into
the Pacific Ocean, defining the boundary between Oregon and
Washington for most of its route." The fish in dispute are hatched in
the headwaters of the Columbia and Snake rivers, a sizeable number
hatched within Idaho's borders. During their lifetime, the salmon
and steelhead migrate downstream, spend several years maturing in
the Pacific, and then return upstream to their original hatching area
where they spawn and eventually die.'
Before the Idaho-bound mature fish reach their spawning
grounds, however, they face a series of life-threatening obstacles, in-
cluding downsteam sport and commercial fishing by both Indian and
non-Indian fishermen and a series of eight dams.' Idaho claimed that
0 1984 by Thomas Hunt Squeri.
1. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, - U.S. __, 103 S. Ct. 2817, 2819 (1983).
2. Id. at 2817.
3. Id. at 2819.
4. Id. at 2819-20.
5. Id. at 2820.
6. Id. at 2820-21. About 15% of the fish are killed at each dam. See also Note, United
States v. Washington (Phase II); The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L.
469, 473 (1982). Idaho, however, was not able to seek relief from the high mortality rate
attributable to the eight dams operated by the Army Corps of Engineers. The United States
refused to participate in the action, invoking its sovereign immunity. As a result, Idaho was
forced to frame its complaint very narrowly to avoid dismissal for failure to join the United
States as an indispensible party under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See Idaho ex rel. Evans v.
Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1979).
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commercial fishermen7 from Oregon and Washington were harvest-
ing a disproportionate share of the returning adult fish before they
reached Idaho, thereby depriving Idaho citizens of their equitable
harvest of salmon and steelhead trout.8
Idaho took the dispute to the United States Supreme Court'
seeking an equitable apportionment of the anadromous (migratory)
fish harvested in Oregon and Washington. The Supreme Court
granted Idaho leave to file a complaint' ° and appointed a special
master to gather evidence and to make recommendations. 1 The
master initially recommended dismissal for failure to join the United
States as an indispensible party."2 Idaho's exceptions to this recom-
mendation were sustained by the Court, and the case was remanded
to the special master for further proceedings." After conducting a
trial, the master issued a final recommendation that the case be dis-
missed on two grounds: (1) that Idaho had not met its burden of
proving sufficient injury caused by downstream fisheries; and (2)
that it would be almost impossible to fashion a workable remedy in
this case." In response, Idaho filed exceptions to this final
recommendation.
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
reviewed the exceptions and held that the special master was correct
in finding that Idaho had not met its burden of demonstrating suffi-
cient injury. As a result, the Court found that Idaho was not entitled
For the same reason, Idaho was unable to seek relief from downstream fishing by Indians
pursuant to their treaty rights. Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (1976). Under the treaty, the
Indians are entitled to "up to 50% of the harvestable catch." Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon:
The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexis-
tence With the Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211, 281 (1981). Because the
United States is trustee of the Indian's fishing rights, its refusal to participate restricted Idaho
from claiming treaty fishing as a source of injury, further limiting Idaho's ability to allege an
injury in its complaint. Idaho ex rel. v. Oregon, 444 U.S. at 386.
7. Idaho's complaint named the commercial harvest of salmon and steelhead as the main
cause of depletion of the fish runs. Just before this action was filed, however, both Washington
and Oregon prohibited commercial harvests of summer chinook salmon and steelhead trout.
Spring chinook harvests have been allowed only twice since then. 103 S. Ct. at 2822.
8. Id. at 2826 (O'Conner J., dissenting).
9. Idaho sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
which provides in part: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction ... of all contro-
versies between two or more states." 103 S. Ct. 2817, 2819. See generally 3 W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 66 (1977) (original jurisdiction
in interstate water disputes).
10. Idaho ex rel. Andrus v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 163 (1976).
11. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 431 U.S. 952 (1976).
12. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980). See also supra note 6.
13. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. at 385.
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2822.
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to an equitable decree apportioning the anadromous fish of the Co-
lumbia-Snake river system.15 As to the master's second finding-that
it would be impossible to fashion a workable decree in this case-the
Court disagreed, holding that the complexity of the apportionment
calculations alone should not prevent the issuance of equitable re-
lief." The action was ultimately dismissed without prejudice to
Idaho's right to bring new proceedings if it can show sufficient
injury."
The Court began its analysis by examining the applicability of
the doctrine of equitable apportionment to the dispute. Equitable ap-
portionment, as traditionally applied, is a judicial means of allocat-
ing the contested waters of interstate streams. 8 However, the Court
reasoned that the fish in this case were "sufficiently similar" to their
river habitat to make this doctrine of water law adaptable to the
dispute. a9 The Court noted that under this doctrine, allocation is
based on each state receiving its fair share of the common resource,
rather than on any preexisting legal rights or entitlements."0
The six-member majority next recognized that equitable appor-
tionment rests on the same principles that underlie many of the
Court's commerce clause decisions, namely, that "a State may not
preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located
within its borders."'" The Court reasoned that even though Idaho
did not have any preexisting right to the salmon and steelhead hatch-
ed in its waters, it had an equitable right to the fair distribution of
this resource. 2 The Court noted that it was manifestly unfair that
Washington and Oregon could harvest a disproportionate share of
the returning fish before they reached Idaho, and concluded that eq-
uitable apportionment was the appropriate remedy to this
15. Id. at 2825.
16. Id. at 2823-24.
17. Id. at 2825. Because the real culprit responsible for the poor fish harvests seems to
be the series of dams along the Columbia and Snake Rivers, combined with heavy fishing by
Indians pursuant to treaty rights, it appears that Idaho may never be able to demonstrate
sufficient injury as long as the United States invokes its sovereign immunity. In this sense,
Idaho had, in reality, lost its case in the early procedural stages, when it was prohibited from
naming the United States in its complaint. See supra note 6.
18. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 132 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2822.
20. Id. at 2823.
21. Id. at 2823. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331
(1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2823.
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unfairness."
The Court, however, denied Idaho relief solely on the basis of
Idaho's inability to prove sufficient injury."' It emphasized that
before the Court can enter a decree of equitable apportionment on
original jurisdiction, the state seeking apportionment "must prove by
clear and convincing evidence some real and substantial injury or
damage." 25 In this case, the Court found that Idaho had taken
58.72% of the total anadromous fish harvest from 1975 through
1980, and concluded that this was not indicative of the required de-
gree of injury. " Moreover, although there was evidence that Oregon
and Washington may have harvested a disproportionate share of the
fish over the long run and may have mismanaged the resource in the
past, the Court reasoned that equitable relief was directed at amelio-
rating present harm and preventing future injuries. Therefore, the
Court would not grant relief for past injury.27
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Conner argued that the 1975
through 1980 time period under consideration was too limited and
did not accurately reflect Idaho's actual injury.2" In those years,
O'Conner argued, the overall harvest was so small that it would be
impossible for Idaho to show substantial harm, as none of the states
had an appreciable harvest. However, in the years before 1975, the
year Idaho filed its complaint, Oregon and Washington harvested a
much greater percentage of salmon and steelhead than Idaho.2 9 The
dissent argued that the Court should consider the downstream prac-
tices in years prior to the filing of the complaint as relevant to an
accurate measurement of injury, because these past injuries contrib-
uted to the present lack of harvestable fish.3"
Prior to the Court's Idaho decision, interstate disputes over nat-
ural resources were primarily resolved through negotiation and in-
terstate compacts.3 ' In a few cases, however, there existed other ave-
nues of potential redress. If the complaining state could show that, in
23. Id. at 2822.
24. Id. at 2824-25.
25. Id. at 2824. This burden of proof has been well established in prior cases. See, e.g.,
Colorado v. New Mexico, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 531, 539 n.13 (1982).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2825.
27. Id. at 2824-25.
28. Id. at 2826-27.
29. Id. at 2828.
30. Id.
31. Before Idaho brought this action for equitable apportionment, it repeatedly sought
admittance to the Oregon-Washington Columbia River Fish Compact Act of Apr. 8, 1918, ch.
47, 40 Stat. 515, but was denied on each occasion. 103 S. Ct. at 2821. The Compact was
formed to "ensure uniformity in state regulation of Columbia River anadromous fish." Id.
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depleting the common resource, a neighboring state was in some way
restricting interstate commerce 2 or discriminating against out of
state citizens, 3 a justiciable constitutional issue might be presented.
In addition, an aggrieved state might have been able to claim owner-
ship of the transitory resource, and bring a suit for infringement of a
property right.3 4 These alternative theories of judicial relief are tenu-
ous at best. In reality, an injured state had little hope for a judicial
determination of interstate resource disputes (other than water con-
flicts) before the Idaho decision.
The Idaho decision will have greater potential impact on future
natural resource disputes than it had on the Columbia-Snake river
fish allocation. Because Idaho was prohibited from litigating the ma-
jor causes of resource depletion 8 and Oregon and Washington no
longer permited significant commercial harvests," the allocation is-
sue was rendered virtually moot by the time the Court reached a
final decision. This left the Court little alternative but to dismiss
Idaho's complaint. In the course of the dismissal, however, the Court
made significant advances in interstate natural resource law.
First, the Court's decision significantly expands the scope of ap-
plication of equitable apportionment. 87 As first promulgated, equita-
ble apportionment appeared to be a mandate for the Court to take
judicial cognizance of a broad spectrum of allocative disputes be-
tween states.38 Until now, however, its use has been strictly limited
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. In order to get relief under the interstate commerce
clause, however, the complaining party would first have to show that the contested resource
was actually part of interstate commerce. The Court has not yet decided whether game fish fall
within the scope of the commerce clause.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. In order to invoke relief under the privileges and
immunities clause, the complaining state would have to show some sort of discrimination
against its citizens caused by the fishing regulations of a neighboring state. The Court has been
reluctant, however, to apply article IV to recreational activities, such as salmon fishing, be-
cause they do not meet the fundamental rights requirement of the privileges and immunities
clause. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); see also
M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, 46-53 (1977).
34. See generally M. BEAN, supra note 33, at 64. Although once a popular legal theory,
state "ownership" of its natural resources is now regarded as a mere fiction, providing little
foundation on which to base legal relief. Id.
35. See supra note 17.
36. See supra note 7.
37. Idaho does not, however, alter the substantive doctrine of equitable apportionment.
38. In establishing the equitable apportionment doctrine the Court said:
[wihenever . . . the action of one state reaches, through the agency of natural
laws, into territory of another state, the question of the extent and the limita-
tions of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute be-
tween them, and this Court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as
will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice
1984]
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to water disputes. In finding anadromous fish "sufficiently similar"
to water to warrant application of the doctrine, 9 the Court begins
an expansion of the doctrine which could make it applicable to a
wider variety of allocative disputes concerning natural resources. For
example, the "sufficiently similar" test could be applied to prevent
the depletion by one state of migratory game herds, such as elk and
deer, which do not abide by state boundaries. Moreover, air could be
held "sufficiently similar" so that one state could be enjoined from
putting pollutants into the airstream which later burden neighboring
states in the form of air pollution or acid rain. It will be up to the
Court to determine the limits of the "sufficiently similar" test in fu-
ture opinions.
Second, in rejecting the special master's argument that the
Court should dismiss the action on the alternate grounds that the
technical complexity of fashioning an equitable decree could be pro-
hibitive,'0 the Court expressed a willingness to take judicial cogni-
zance of difficult, technical disputes. Moreover, in an earlier decision
on this same action, the Court held that even if it had to retain con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the management of the fisheries, that should
not prevent it from issuing the requested relief."1 It should be noted
that this activist role of the federal courts in environmental disputes
is not necessarily new."2 The Idaho decision is a further indication
and affirmation by the Supreme Court of the expansion of the role of
the judiciary in the resolution of often complex natural resources and
environmental disputes.
Finally, in its explanation of equitable apportionment, the
Court emphasized a state's affirmative duty to "conserve and even to
augment the natural resources within [its borders] for the benefit of
other states.'4 Although this duty to augment is not new, 4 it is
significant that for the first time the Court discusses it in reference to
resources other than water. According to the dicta of the opinion, if
between them.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1906).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2822.
40. Id. at 2822.
41. 444 U.S. 380, 390 n.7.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) reh'g denied. In this case the
district court appointed a "fishmaster" to oversee implementation of the court's decision and
retained continuing jurisdiction. See also M. BEAN, supra note 33, at 62.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2823 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, U.S. __, 103 S. Ct.
531, 546 (1982); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
44. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. at 549; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419, 434 (1922).
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Idaho had been able to demonstrate the requisite injury, the Court
would not be overstepping its bounds in requiring Oregon and
Washington to enhance the Columbia River salmon and steelhead
runs."5 The impact of this duty to augment depends, of course, on
how broadly the Court will extend the "sufficiently similar" test of
equitable apportionment.
The adaptation of equitable apportionment to the allocation of
anadromous fish was simply a logical expansion of the doctrine. Rul-
ing that a coveted interstate resource must be shared in fairness to
the interested parties is certainly not revolutionary. Indeed, it was
merely an extension of the well established Constitutional principles
which prohibit discrimination in interstate commerce. The true diffi-
culty lies in the fashioning of an equitable decree which reflects these
principles. Just what is Idaho's fair share of the fish?" The Court
was able to avoid this question by dismissing Idaho's complaint for
failure to meet the burden of proof with regard to its injury. In so
doing, the Court was able to make a broad, perhaps unrealistic,
statement about its duty to provide equitable relief in even the most
complex technical disputes,4 while side-stepping the rigors of fash-
ioning that relief in the case at bar. In dismissing Idaho's complaint
on procedural grounds, the Court gave itself a safe forum to an-
nounce an expansion of its rule on complex dispute resolution.
This maneuver suggests a certain brilliance by the majority. By
deciding a virtually moot question the Court was able to make new
substantive natural resources law without having to face the realities
of its own decision. But the Court may not be able to avoid this issue
again." If Idaho can ever muster sufficient evidence to show injury,
or if other states bring similar allqcative claims, the Court will even-
tually have to wrestle with all of the complex factors and actually
decide the equities involved.
Despite the Court's dismissal of Idaho's complaint, its decision
in Idaho represents a significant addition to the law of natural re-
sources. In holding that equitable apportionment was appropriate to
the apportionment of fish as well as water, the Court opened up a
potentially new avenue for transitory resource allocation and ex-
pressed its willingness to play an active role in contested resource
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2827 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
46. This is a question raised by the dissent. 103 S. Ct. at 2828.
47. Id. at 2824. See also supra text accompanying note 41.
48. See generally Comment, Sohappy v. Smith: Eight Years of Litigation Over Indian
Fishing Rights, 56 OR. L. REV. 680 (1977) (describing the difficulty of judicial administration
of the Columbia River anadromous fish).
1984]
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management. In Idaho, however, the Court did not have to deal with
the complex realities inherent in this expanded, quasi-administrative
role. The real test of the Court's judicial activism in resource litiga-
tion will come in the future when the Court is called upon to put
some teeth into the language of its Idaho decision.
Thomas Hunt Squeri
STATE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ECO-
NOMIC REASONS-Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 103
S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
In 1977, Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas
and Electric (PG&E) submitted plans for three proposed nuclear en-
ergy plants to the California State Energy Resources and Develop-
ment Commission (Energy Commission) for consideration.' These
plans failed to win the approval of the Energy Commission, due pri-
marily to the existence of the Warren-Alquist Act of 1974 and its
amendments.' The Warren-Alquist Act required state certification
for all electric power generating plants in California. The amend-
ments, dubbed the "Nuclear Laws," dealt solely with the nuclear
industry and were passed in response to the ever-increasing problem
of inadequate storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel.'
In particular, sections 25524.1(b)4 and 25524.2' of the Act evi-
dence a growing concern on the part of the legislature for the eco-
nomic feasibility of constructing atomic energy plants. The former
section is concerned with the interim storage of spent fuel and the
fuel core, requiring an ad hoc determination by the Energy Commis-
sion that "adequate" storage facilities will be included in the plant
design. Section 25524.2 addresses itself to the permanent disposal of
radioactive waste and imposes a moratorium on further certification
of nuclear power plants until the Energy Commission "finds that
there has been developed, and that the United States through its au-
thorized agency has approved, and there exists a demonstrated tech-
© 1984 by Elizabeth Viney.
1. L. A. Daily J., Apr. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
2. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517,
25520, 25523, 25328, 25532, 25524.1, 25524.2 and 25524.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
3. Spent nuclear fuel is the high-level radioactive waste that remains after the energy
has been generated. Initially water-filled pools were used as storage areas for the interim pe-
riod between removal and reprocessing of the spent fuel, as well as for temporary holding of
the entire fuel core. Because reprocessing techniques are as yet unrefined, contrary to industry
projections, the radioactive spent fuel has been allowed to accumulate to its present worrisome
levels. The result of this technological lag is that a number of reactors may be compelled to
cease operation, as their pools reach storage capacity. For a general discussion of this so-called
"clog" in the nuclear cycle, see Cohen, High Level Radioactive Waste, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J.
703 (1981).
4. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25524.1(b) (West 1977).
5. Id. § 25524.2.
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nology or means for.the disposal of high-level nuclear waste.'' 6
Both companies were subsequently forced to abandon their re-
spective projects. They then filed suit in the United States District
Court for California claiming that uncertainties caused by the Nu-
clear Laws had caused cancellation of their plans. SCE and PG&E
sought a declaration that the Warren-Alquist Act was preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act' and was thus void under the Supremacy
Clause. Finding that SCE and PG&E had standing to challenge the
statute, the District Court granted judgment for the utilities.8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the
petitioners had standing,9 but held that section 25524.1(b) was not
ripe for adjudication. The time for adjudication of section 25524.2,
however, was deemed proper.10 The Ninth Circuit rejected the pre-
emption analysis of the district court and held instead that section
25524.2 was expressly authorized under sections 271 and 274(k) of
the Atomic Energy Act and therefore constituted a valid exercise of
the state's regulatory . . . power."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
questions of ripeness and preemption.' In a unanimous decision, the
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court's findings on both issues.'"
In so doing, the Court reiterated the rules on preemption and ripe-
ness it has developed over the past several years.
In determining the question of ripeness, Justice White, writing
for the Court, found section 25524.1(b) unfit for adjudication.' 4
Since the Energy Commission must make determinations on a case-
by-case basis, the Court reasoned that there is no certainty that the
6. Id. § 25524.2(a). Such a finding on the part of the Energy Commission must be
presented to the state legislature where either house can disaffirm it. Id. § 25524.2(b).
7. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. I-IV 1977-1981) (origi-
nally enacted 1946).
8. 489 F. Supp. 699 (1980), rev'd, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 1713
(1983). The court issued rulings on three points: (1) petitioners had standing to bring the suit;
(2) both § 25524.1(b) and § 25524.2 presented questions that were ripe for adjudication; (3)
both provisions were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act insofar as they attempted to regu-
late nuclear power plants. Id.
9. 659 F.2d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
10. Id. at 918.
11. Id. at 925.
12. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1721. The Court utilized two factors by which to measure the provisions: the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration. This was the test set forth by the Court in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-49 (1967).
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storage capacity of a nuclear plant will at some future time be judg-
ed inadequate.15 The Court therefore elected to await further devel-
opments before reviewing section 25524.1(b). Because postponement
of consideration of the validity of the moratorium would only serve
to exacerbate industry confusion, however, section 25524.2 was
deemed ripe for adjudication."
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the California
provision was preempted as a result of previous occupation of the
field by Congress or by virtue of conflict with federal legislation. 7
Upon careful examination of the Atomic Energy Act, its subse-
quent amendments, and actions taken by the offspring Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (NRC), the Court concluded that two areas of
nuclear power generation are the exclusive province of the federal
government: the operation and construction of the power plants
themselves and all radiological safety aspects attendant thereto."
This finding contravened contentions presented by both parties. Peti-
tioners had claimed that the federal government was the sole regula-
tor in all areas of nuclear power, not merely those delineated by the
Court. 9 Respondents, on the other hand, had argued that a state
could place a moratorium on new construction "until its safety con-
cerns are satisfied by the federal government. ''20
In refusing to expand the list of preempted fields as requested
by petitioners, the Court relied heavily on two factors. First, the leg-
islature has traditionally allowed states to retain authority in matters
pertaining to generation of electricity. Second, there is a notable ab-
sence of statutory language enunciating any change in this policy. 2'
Especially convincing to the Court was the apparent purpose of the
Atomic Energy Act to insure continued state responsibility in making
the initial determination regarding actual need, cost, and other re-
15. 103 S.Ct. at 1720. The Court further held that since § 25524.2 is not preempted by
federal law, there is little likelihood that industry behavior would be uniquely affected by
whatever uncertainty surrounds the interim storage provision.
16. Id. at 1721. The Court was convinced by the "palpable and considerable hardship"
that would be visited upon the nuclear industry were the moratorium's validity to remain
unconfirmed.
17. Petitioners propounded three arguments for preemption: (1) the federal government,
through the Atomic Energy Act, has exclusively occupied the field of nuclear power genera-
tion; (2) the statute conflicts with congressional directives, as well as with those of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC); and (3) the provision poses an obstacle to the expressed fed-
eral objective of developing fission as a viable energy source. Id. at 1722.
18. Id. at 1723.
19. Id. at 1722-23.
20. Id. at 1726.
21. Id.
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lated state concerns. States are neither required to authorize the de-
velopment of nuclear plants, nor are they prohibited from refusing to
allow their construction.22 Section 271 of the Act confirmed this par-
ticipatory role of the states the Court stated.2" The Court noted,
moreover, that the 1959 Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act un-
derscored the distinction between proper federal and state concerns.
For example, section 274(k), as amended, reads: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local
agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.""'
While section 274(k), therefore, leaves the states with a certain
measure of latitude, the Court made clear that it effectively disposed
of any possible state regulation of safety measures.2 5 The majority
recognized that any attempt by the states to so legislate would con-
flict with a judgment of the NRC that "nuclear construction may
proceed notwithstanding extant uncertainties as to waste disposal." 26
The Court, therefore, found it necessary to inquire whether section
25524.2 was intended to regulate for reasons of safety, or for some
"other purpose" as provided under section 274(k).
Petitioners argued that section 25524.2 was clearly rooted in a
legislative concern for the safety of its citizens. First, the utilities
noted that there already exists a state administrative body in Califor-
nia empowered to make decisions regarding the economic feasibility
22. Id. at 1722.
23. Atomic Energy Act § 271, Pub. L. 89-135, 79 Stat. 851 (1965) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2018 (1976)). It declares: "nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to affect the
authority of regulations of any [flederal, [sitate or local agency with respect to the generation,
sale or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by
the Commission ....
24. Atomic Energy Act § 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688-91 (1959) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976)).
25. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1726. There are a number of exceptions to
this general rule. States maintain an advisory role concerning activities within the NRC's ex-
clusive jurisdiction. Atomic Energy Act § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(l) (1976). The Commission
must cooperate with the states even in the formulation of standards for regulation against
radiation hazards. Atomic Energy Act § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1976). In addition, §
274(b) allows the states to contract with the NRC for control over special nuclear material
under limited conditions. Atomic Energy Act § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976 & Supp.). But
see Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afftd, 405 U.S.
1035 (1972), where the Court summarily affirmed the finding of preemption where Minnesota
attempted to regulate radioactive waste discharges for purposes of safety.
26. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1727, 1729-30. This singular concern for
public health and safety is reflected as well in the NRC's recent repeal of all provisions relat-
ing to the economic considerations involved in certifying a plant for construction. Id. at 1724.
27. Id. at 1727.
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of constructing new reactors.2 Justice White recognized California's
authority to employ this case-by-case method of examination, but
also found the targeted problem of waste disposal to be so prevalent
as to warrant a general legislative judgment.2 Second, the utilities
claimed that the Nuclear Laws shared a common heritage with Pro-
position 15, an initiative manifestly based on safety concerns, and
thus should be "presumed to have been enacted for the same [safety]
purposes."3 ° The Court refused to consider this argument as a possi-
ble "taint" on section 25524.2, however. Because the initiative was
not passed, and thus was not before the court, such a contention was
deemed irrelevant."
The Court ended its preemption analysis with two final reasons
for accepting California's avowed economic purpose rationale for
section 25524.2. First, the Court reiterated its reluctance to inquire
into legislative motive. Second, since Congress has evidently permit-
ted the states to retain enough authority to deny certification for eco-
nomic reasons on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated it is Con-
gress's duty to investigate any possible misuse of this authority.3
The second area examined by the Court concerned possible pre-
emption due to conflict with existing federal regulation. Petitioners
argued that section 25524.2 was in direct conflict with federal legis-
lation delegating the regulation of nuclear waste disposal to the
NRC, as well as with a specific NRC determination. 3 The Court
found that since it was possible for the states to comply with both
section 25524.2 and the existing federal and NRC directives, no con-
flict existed.3 4 Because the states are not required to construct nu-
clear power plants in the first place, and the NRC order states only
that "it is safe to proceed with such plants, not that it is economically
28. Id. at 1728. That body is the California Public Utilities Commission. Id.
29. Id. at 1728.
30. Id. Proposition 15 was an initiative submitted to California's voters in June of 1976.
The proposition barred the construction of any new nuclear power plants until a permanent
waste disposal method was developed. As a rationale for the bar, Proposition 15 cited its con-
cern about the threat of harm to "the land or the people of ... California." Id. at n.27.
31. Id. Petitioners also argued that if California had been truly concerned with finances,
it would have shown more concern for the cost of the technology ultimately selected by the
federal government, and would have prohibited construction by the utilities outside the state.
Justice White condemned these assertions as "myopic" and "hypothetical." Id. at 1727.
32. Id. at 1728.
33. Id. at 1729. The Court noted that in Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC,
582 F.2d 166, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1978), the NRC had been requested to discontinue licensing of
reactors until a permanent disposal method for high-level waste was approved. There, the
NRC concluded, that given the progress toward the development of disposal facilities and the
availability of interim storage, it could continue to license new reactors.
34. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1729.
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wise to do so," the Court reasoned that California's economically-
grounded moratorium is not in conflict with federal legislation. 5
The Court stated that this conclusion is bolstered by express reliance
in section 25524.2 on federal government in selecting an adequate
technology, demonstrating that there is no attempt by the state to
dictate acceptable standards. 6
Petitioners next challenged section 25524.2 as conflicting with
recent federal legislation, specifically the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982, which represented a financial commitment by Congress to
research on radioactive waste disposal. This claim was found want-
ing for two reasons: (1) the House had considered an amendment
that the bill "satisfy any legal requirements for the existence of an
approved technology,"3 7 but had rejected such language in an effort
"to insure that there be no preemption;" and (2) the Act could be
interpreted as relating only to disposal problems of existing nuclear
power plants.3 8 The Court was furthermore unconvinced that the
state provisions in any way frustrated the federal objective of pro-
moting nuclear energy. 9
While the judgment of the Court was unanimous, Justice
Blackmun authored an opinion concurring only in part with the ma-
jority.40 He primarily emphasized that the Court's declaration pro-
scribing state enforcement of a moratorium based on a safety ration-
ale was merely dictum.4 1 Because California was not motivated by
safety concerns, Justice Blackmun found the suggestion "unnecessary
to the Court's holding." '4 2 Furthermore, he disagreed with the es-
sence of the dictum and asserted that Congress merely intended to
encourage nuclear power generation as one of many alternative en-
ergy options.4 3 The states would then be invited to balance all fac-
tors, including safety, in determining the optimum system for their
provinces.4 4 Such a reading would not only survive the preemption
tests, but would provide a more consistent and tangible foundation
than the "elusive test of legislative motive." '4 5
35. Id. at 1729-30.
36. Id. at 1730.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1731-32.
40. Id. at 1732 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
41. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1735 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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As noted by the Court, there are essentially only two justifica-
tions for the finding of preemption: either Congress has occupied the
field, or the law in question conflicts with a constitutional or con-
gressional provision."'
The former area, sometimes referred to as jurisdictional pre-
emption, requires a determination of congressional intent to occupy
the respective field. 47 The existence of this intent can be evinced ei-
ther specifically, as with language within the legislation expressing
such a design, or by inference. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,4
the Court delineated three factors from which it may be inferred that
Congress meant to occupy the field: (1) the pervasiveness of the reg-
ulation; (2) the dominance of the federal interest; and (3) the nature
of the subject matter.49 Recent decisions have suggested a disinclina-
tion towards finding this implied intent and have required instead a
"clear and manifest purpose" on the part of Congress to maintain
exclusive regulatory authority.5" In New York State Department of
Social Services v. Dublino,5' the Court asserted its preference for the
specific intent standard: "It will not be presumed that a federal stat-
ute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so."52 Such a
view would appear to reject the assumption upon which the Rice
factors are based-that Congress is presumably not concerned with
possible preemption of state laws when drafting legislation.5"
A further development in occupation preemption has been the
shift away from a presumption of preemption to a more state-di-
rected perspective.54 This reflects an increasing tendency of the
Court to accord more weight to state interests and to balance these
interests against the need for federal regulation. The Court has been
46. See supra text accompanying note 17. See generally Tribe, California Declines the
Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 688 (1979). For
an examination of the preemption doctrine as applied to state efforts to regulate nuclear power
in general, see Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear Moratorium Legislation in the States: A Case of
Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976).
47. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413(1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)); accord Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Compare Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973).
51. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
52. Id. at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1959)).
53. See, Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 645-46 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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most protective of the states when the statutory scheme is cooperative
in nature and details a common purpose with the federal legisla-
tion." In general, it appears that the Court is ih favor of finding
against preemption and inviting congressional intervention in the
field.56
The second possible basis for a finding of preemption is when
the state legislation conflicts with either the provisions or the purpose
of a federal law. Although previous courts have asserted that a po-
tential conflict is sufficient, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul57 established that an actual conflict must exist, and that it
must be physically impossible to comply with both regulations. In
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,58 the Court
concluded that a reconciliation of state and federal laws, whenever
possible, is preferable to the complete invalidation of one of the laws
due to conflict.
State legislation can also be preempted if it conflicts with the
purpose of the federal regulations by providing an obstacle to the
accomplishment of congressional objectives. 9 A conflict peripheral to
the federal act's main objective is not enough; it must be of substance
and have more than an incidental effect on the operation of the act.60
This requirement reflects the Court's increased attentiveness to state
interests, to an extent where protection thereof may outweigh cer-
tainty in achievement of federal goals.61
Although the Court, in deciding PG&E, used the established
tests from Rice and Florida Lime, these standards provided only a
framework in which the Court assumed a degree of flexibility. As in
previous cases,6" the Court employed the traditional analytical tools
of preemption law, but found no preemption. In questioning whether
the field was occupied by Congress, the Court readily found a state-
directed presumption because Congress had regulated in an area tra-
ditionally occupied by the states. This presumption could only be
overcome by a showing of specific intent on the part of Congress to
act as sole authority in the field.6" In so deciding, the Court refused
55. Dublino, 413 U.S. at 421.
56. Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546.
57. 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
58. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
59. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
60. Dublino, 413 U.S. at 423, n.20.
61. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bricon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1974).
62. See, e.g., Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546; Dublino, 413 U.S. at 405.
63. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1723 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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to consider whether intent could by inferred by implementing the
Rice factors, and thus placed a heavy burden on the federal
government.
The justices were, however, willing to "infer" the intent of
Congress to leave questions concerning the generation of electricity
and the economics of power plant construction, to the states."' This
inference was motivated in part by the customary judicial abhorrence
of regulatory vacuums, as well as by careful statutory analysis of
sections 271 and 274 of the Atomic Energy Act. The Court was con-
sistent and precise in its interpretation of both state and federal legis-
lative language. Because concern for the economic health of the state
was not a safety-related purpose, the Court found California's law
protected under section 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act.65 Perhaps
most significant was the Court's reliance on the avowed motive of the
California legislature.6 If the history of section 25524.2, particularly
the influence of Proposition 15, had been given as much attention as
that of the Atomic Energy Act, the Court could possibly have
reached a contrary result.
This flexibility of analysis was also apparent in the examina-
tion of the conflict between state and federal legislation and the find-
ing that no actual conflict existed. The justices were clearly im-
pressed with the California provision that complemented the federal
act by expressly leaving the development and choice of waste dispo-
sal technologies to the federal government. This attitude echoes the
sentiment of Merrill Lynch-that reconciliation is to be preferred to
harsh invalidation.6 7 In the instant case, the Court sought to recon-
cile section 25524.2 with the recently enacted Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982.68 It accomplished this reconciliation in part because
Congress was not explicit in its language and because "it is certainly
possible to interpret the Act as directed at existing reactors."6
In determining that the federal objective was not frustrated by
the California statute, the Court essentially balanced the desirability
of an all-out promotion of nuclear energy against the interest held by
the state. Finding that promotion was not to be accomplished "at all
64. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1724.
65. Id. at 1725.
66. Id. at 1728.
67. 414 U.S. at 127.
68. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1730. See generally Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982).
69. Pacic Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1730.
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costs,"'70 the Court implicitly recognized the greater value in the
maintenance by a state of its economic welfare. 7 ' Since Congress had
apparently granted the states the authority to protect this interest,
the Court emphasized that it was merely affirming already-en-
71sconced powers.
A noteworthy aspect of the opinion is the repeated and explicit
invitation to Congress to "rethink the division of regulatory authority
in light of its possible exercise by the states to undercut a federal
objective."'7 ' This laissez-faire attitude of the Court towards state
laws that might possibly be contrary to congressional designs is illus-
trative of the trend of the Burger Court in preemption cases in gen-
eral. Additionally, while it forces Congress to give attention to the
states when promulgating legislation, it also underlines the signifi-
cant power of Congress to redraw at will the line between the states
and the federal government.
Because California's legislation was found to be inspired by
concern for the economic welfare of the state, rather than the physi-
cal welfare of its citizens, section 25524.2 was not preempted by fed-
eral legislation. PG&E thus informs both Congress and the states
that the NRC is not the sole regulator in nuclear power concerns.
The states retain authority in those areas they traditionally occupied,
including the generation of electricity, and in its accompanying con-
siderations such as need, reliability, economic questions, and presum-
ably any other aspect that is not safety-related in purpose. While
this seemingly arms the states with numerous anti-nuclear legislative
techniques, such an expectation may be premature. The federal leg-
islature clearly has the power to curtail this authority, either through
legislation aimed directly at the states, or by fighting economics with
economics. Whichever course Congress chooses, at least the Court
will have achieved its dual objective of alerting Congress to the valid-
ity of certain state-held powers under existing federal regulation,
while protecting state interests in accordance with the letter of this
law.
Elizabeth Viney
70. Id. at 1731.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1731-32.
73. Id. at 1732.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AGUILAR-SPINELLI TWO-
PRONGED TEST ABANDONED-CORROBORATED
ANONYMOUS TIP PROVIDED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE UNDER TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES ANAL-
YSIS-Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department' re-
ceived an anonymous, handwritten letter advising them that a local
couple, Lance and Sue Gates, were making their living selling
drugs.2 The letter described in some detail how the couple often
traveled to Florida separately and then drove back together with the
drugs. The letter stated that the couple planned to make another trip
to Florida within a few days and would be bringing back "over
$100,000 in drugs."3 In addition, the letter alleged that at present
there was "over $100,000 worth of drugs in [the Gates'] basement." 4
The Chief of Police referred the letter to Detective Charles Ma-
der to pursue the anonymous tip. Working with agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, state officials, and police officers,
Detective Mader learned that Lance Gates flew to Florida on May
5th, met his wife at a motel, and was observed leaving West Palm
© 1984 by Jeffrey B. Hare.
1. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983). Bloomingdale, Illinois is a suburb of
Chicago located in DuPage County.
2. The letter read as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly
make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are
done in Florida. Sue, his wife, drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to
be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back
after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again
and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance
drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs.
Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They
are friends with some big drugs [sic] dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums
103 S. Ct. at 2325.
3. Id.
4. Id. There was nothing in the letter to indicate how the anonymous author obtained
his information.
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Beach with his wife in the family car the following morning, pre-
sumably headed for Bloomingdale.' Based on this information,
Detective Mader submitted an affidavit in support of his application
for a search warrant, together with a copy of the anonymous letter,
to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois.'
A warrant to search the Gates' residence and automobile was
issued. When the Gates returned to their home in Bloomingdale, ap-
proximately twenty hours after they had been observed leaving West
Palm Beach, th2 waiting police searched the car and the house pur-
suant to the warrant. The police found approximately 350 pounds of
marijuana in the trunk of the car and discovered more marijuana,
weapons, and other contraband in the Gates' home.'
Defendant's motion to quash the arrest and to suppress the evi-
dence seized by the police was granted on the basis that there was no
showing that the author of the anonymous letter had obtained the
information in a reliable manner. Thus, the warrant was invalid
under the requirements set forth in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Aguilar v. Texas8 and Spinelli v. United States.' The state ap-
pealed, but the decision was affirmed by both the Illinois Appellate
Court'0 and the Supreme Court of Illinois."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the respondents' rights under the fourth amendment had
been violated by a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on
5. Id. at 2325-26. Detective Mader found out from the Illinois Secretary of State that
an Illinois driver's license had been issued to one Lance Gates with a Bloomingdale address.
Detective Mader obtained a more recent address through a confidential informant from certain
financial records, and from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport, he learned that a "L.
Gates" had made a reservation for an airline flight to Palm Beach, Florida, on May 5. Sur-
veillance of the flight by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration confirmed that Gates
had boarded the flight in Chicago and upon arrival in Florida proceeded by taxi to a nearby
motel, where he went to a room registered to a Susan Gates. At 7:00 a.m. the next day,
according to DEA agents, Gates and an "unidentified woman" left the motel in a Mercury
bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound "on an interstate frequently used by trav-
elers to the Chicago area." A check of the vehicle license number on the Mercury revealed that
the license was registered to a Hornet station wagon owned by the Gates. Id.
6. Id. at 2326.
7. Id.
8. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
9. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli: "Although an
affidavit may be based on hearsay information . . . the magistrate must be informed of some of
the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant ...was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' " Aguilar, 378
U.S. at 114; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413.
10. People v. Gates, 82 11. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980).
11. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
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the basis of a partially corroborated, anonymous informant's tip.12
After hearing oral arguments on this issue, the Court requested the
parties to return and address the additional question of whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified by allowing a good-faith
exception.'
In a six-three decision,' 4 the Court ruled that: (1) the exclusion-
ary rule modification issue would not be considered, since it had not
been "pressed or passed upon" in the courts below;'" (2) the "two-
pronged test" developed under Aguilar and Spinelli would be aban-
doned in favor of a "totality of circumstances" approach;' 6 and (3)
under the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the corroboration
of the details in the anonymous letter was sufficient to provide the
judge with a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause
to search the respondents' vehicle and residence existed. 7
The Court announced that it would not consider the issue of
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified since the issue had
not been presented to the Illinois courts.' 8 Justice Rehnquist noted
that at every level in the Illinois judicial system the defendants had
expressly claimed that the fourth amendment had been violated by
the acts of the Illinois police, and therefore the evidence seized
should be excluded. However, while the state had challenged this
claim, it had never raised or addressed the issue of whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be modified.'
The confusion stemmed, in part, from the Court's inability to
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
13. 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.). The Court suggested that the modification of the
exclusionary rule established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and later ap-
plied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would be to not exclude evidence
obtained in a reasonable belief that the search and seizure was not in violation of the fourth
amendment. 103 S. Ct. 436.
14. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined. Justice White filed an opinion concur-
ring with the judgment; Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall
joined; Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. 103 S. Ct. at
2317.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2321 (citing McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309 U.S. 430, 435-
36 (1940). "But it is ... the settled practice of this Court . . . that it is only in exceptional
cases . . . that it considers questions . . . not pressed or passed upon in the courts below." Id.
16. See infra note 22.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2334 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960)).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2321. This was the argument of the dissent to the order of the Court
on November 29, 1982, 103 S. Ct. 436, (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that it was the "Court's settled practice of not permitting a
party to advance a ground for reversal that was not presented below." 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
19. Id. at 2323.
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determine whether or not the exclusionary rule modification issue
had been clearly "pressed or passed upon" below. The Court admit-
ted that it could not clearly distinguish whether the issue would in-
volve an enlargement of an issue already presented or an entirely
new question.20 However, the Court has since heard two cases in-
volving the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified
by a good faith exception.21
The Court next addressed the issue of whether the Illinois
courts had applied the proper test in determining whether the search
warrant was valid. The Illinois courts had ruled that the affidavit
submitted by the Bloomingdale police had failed to meet the "two-
pronged test" derived from the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Aguilar and Spinelli.22 The United States Supreme Court
in Gates concluded that the "two-pronged test" should be abandoned
in favor of the more practical "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach.2" The issue addressed in Aguilar and Spinelli was whether
the facts and circumstances presented in an affidavit based on an
informant's tip were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause
to issue a search warrant, in accordance with the requirements of the
fourth amendment." ' In Aguilar, the Court held that an affidavit
based on the hearsay information provided by an informant's tip
must apprise the magistrate of the informant's basis of knowledge,
20. Id. at 2322. The issue is whether the facts in Gates would be a sufficient basis on
which to establish a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Since the state had not
argued this issue and set forth facts to justify their position, the Court was left with insufficient
facts on which to base a ruling. To rule otherwise would have involved the "framing of broad
rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, which may prove ill-considered in other circum-
stances" with the consequent threat of "untoward practical ramifications." Id. at 2324-25.
21. On July 5, 1984, the Supreme Court decided the following cases: Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (both cases
holding that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when evidence is obtained by officers
acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magsitrate
but subsequently determined to be invalid).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2327. The "veracity" prong of Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108, could not be
satisfied since the letter provided neither a basis for concluding that the informant was credi-
ble, nor an indication of the informant's "basis of knowledge." The Illinois court understood
Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410, to permit an inference of reliability if the informant provided sufficient
detail to support such an inference. The Illinois courts concluded that there had been no show-
ing of probable cause. 103 S.Ct. at 2327.
23. Id. at 2332.
24. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. art. IV.
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and the informant must be credible."6 In Spinelli, the Court ruled
that if the informant's tip failed to meet either the "basis of knowl-
edge" or the "veracity" test of Aguilar, probable cause could still be
established by independent corroboration of the details to the extent
that a magistrate could infer that the informant had obtained his
information in a reliable manner.26
Moreover, the Spinelli Court stated that the informant's tip
should contain sufficient detail so that in the absence of a "basis of
knowledge" statement, the magistrate could rely on something more
substantial than a casual underworld rumor or a general accusa-
tion.27 The Spinelli Court cited Draper v. United States28 as a
"suitable benchmark" for determining the sufficiency of detail."
The Court in Gates agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court
that an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge were
all highly relevant. However, the Court declared that these elements
were not separate and independent requirements to be rigidly ap-
plied. Rather, these elements were closely intertwined issues to be
considered in making a common-sense, practical determination
whether there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a search
warrant."0
Thus, the Court attempted to steer a narrow course by provid-
ing adequate guidance. The Court further attempted to avoid a per-
ceived tendency of lower courts to seize upon specific terms and ig-
nore the fact that probable cause is a "fluid concept" which cannot
be reduced to a concise set of legal rules. 1 Citing Justice Rutledge's
opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 2 the Court stated that proba-
ble cause dealt with probabilities and factual and practical considera-
tions, not merely technical considerations."3
As a result, the Court reaffirmed the totality of circumstances
25. 378 U.S. at 113-14.
26. 393 U.S. at 417-18.
27. Id. at 416 quoted in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327 n.3.
28. 358 U.S. 307 (1959), cited with approval in Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
29. 393 U.S. at 416. In Draper, a reliable informant had given police an extremely
accurate and detailed description of defendant's predicted activities, manner of dress, and the
fact he would be carrying narcotics. Police observed the defendant, verified the informant's
description, and then searched the defendant without a warrant. Defendant's motion to sup-
press was denied. 358 U.S. 307.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28.
31. Id. at 2328-29 & n.6.
32. 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (federal officers had probable cause to stop and search, without
a warrant, an automobile driven by someone known to be engaged in the unlawful trade of
transporting and selling liquor).
33. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175).
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approach which it reasoned was more consistent with the traditional
analysis in making probable cause determinations.34 The Court fur-
ther suggested that the task of the issuing magistrate was simply to
make a practical, common-sense determination, based on all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, that there was a "fair
probability" that a search would reveal evidence of a crime. 5 The
Court stated that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that proba-
ble cause existed.36
The third issue considered by the Court was whether a partially
corroborated tip from an anonymous informant provided a substan-
tial basis for finding probable cause to issue a search warrant. The
Supreme Court had never before considered whether a tip from an
anonymous informant could be used by police to establish probable
cause. " Unlike tips provided by confidential informants whose iden-
tities are known to police and whose credibility can be determined in
part by previous experience, the veracity of anonymous informants is
unknown and undeterminable. 8
Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court
found that probable cause for a warrant authorizing the search of
the Gates' vehicle and residence was established by the anonymous
letter which had been partially corroborated by Detective Mader's
efforts.3 9 The Court reasoned that the showing of probable cause in
Gates was as compelling as that in Draper v. United States,'0 which
the Court cited as the "classic case on the value of corroborative ef-
forts of police officials."' 1
The Court noted that an affidavit relying on hearsay is not nec-
essarily insufficient as long as there is a substantial basis for credit-
ing the information.42 The information must be reasonably corrobo-
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2332. As examples of this "traditional analysis," the Court cites Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed); United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (courts should not interpret affidavit in a techni-
cal, rather than a common-sense manner); and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949) (the rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception).
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
36. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 271).
37. Silverberg, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the
SpinellilDraper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 101 (1982).
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
39. Id. at 2334-35.
40. Id. at 2334; Draper, 358 U.S. 307.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
42. Id. at 2335 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 269, 271). Although hearsay is generally not
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rated by the police,4 and the informant's credibility must be subject
to the scrutiny of the court."" Thus, the Court reasoned that while
the facts obtained by Detective Mader's independent investigation,
standing alone, suggested that the Gates were involved in drug traf-
ficking, their true value was in indicating that the informant's other
assertions were more likely to be true." Although the Court admit-
ted that this degree of corroboration might have failed to satisfy the
veracity prong of Spinelli, it was sufficient to make a practical, com-
mon-sense determination of probable cause."' In addition, the Court
noted that the anonymous letter contained detailed facts and condi-
tions neither easily obtained nor easily predicted.47
One commentator has suggested that anonymous tips can pro-
vide a sufficient basis for finding probable cause if the tips are "spe-
cific" and the corroborated details are "incriminating," as opposed to
"innocent. '48 The Illinois Supreme Court found that the verification
of details in the anonymous letter was simply the "corroboration of
innocent activity. '49
The United States Supreme Court, however, dismissed the ne-
cessity of making such a distinction, declaring that the relevant in-
quiry was not whether the particular conduct was "innocent" or
"guilty," but rather, the degree of suspicion aroused by particular
types of non-criminal acts.5" The Court reasoned that innocent be-
havior frequently will be sufficient for a showing of probable cause
and, in the interest of citizen's security, a more rigorous definition of
probable cause should not be imposed.5 1 The Court concluded, there-
fore, that anonymous tips, containing a range of details not easily
obtained, which were "reasonably corroborated," and which aroused
considered legally competent evidence in a criminal trial, Draper, 358 U.S. 307, 311, there is a
difference between the amount of proof required to prove guilt in a criminal case and the
amount required to show probable cause for arrest or search. Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2334 (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 269).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
45. Id. at 2334-35. Interestingly, the independent investigation only revealed that the
Gates had gone to and then departed from West Palm Beach, Florida. No drugs or transac-
tions were observed. Still, the Court noted that "li]n addition to being a popular vacation site,
Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics and other illegal drugs." The Court admitted
that this activity was "as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of an ordinary vacation
trip." Id.
46. Id. at 2335.
47. Id.
48. Silverberg, supra note 37, at 124 n.233.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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a sufficient "degree of suspicion," provided a substantial basis for
determining probable cause.
52
Justice White concurred in the judgment of the Court, but
stated that the Court should and could have addressed the exclusion-
ary rule and good faith issue. Justice White explained that he would
have reached the conclusion that the search was valid using the
Aguilar-Spinelli approach.5" In a lengthy statement, Justice White
reasoned that the exclusionary rule issue was properly before the
Court and disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the statute
conferring jurisdiction in the case. 54 Further, he stated that the rec-
ord was adequate to determine whether the Bloomingdale Police ac-
ted in good faith and that any deficiencies could be resolved on re-
mand.55 Justice White noted that the exclusionary rule was adopted
as a judicial remedy and cautioned that, at times, its application may
operate to discourage reasonable and proper investigative actions by
police.5
The Court's decision to forego considering whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be modified by a good faith exception undoubt-
edly surprised many who had anticipated a landmark ruling on this
issue.57 Equally surprising, however, was the Court's decision to
abandon the twenty year-old, two-pronged test of Aguilar-Spinelli
and to adopt a totality of circumstances approach to determine
whether there was sufficient probable cause to issue a search war-
rant. 8 Although the Court did not consider the exclusionary rule
modification issue, its adoption of the totality of circumstances ap-
proach will have significant impact on the application of the rule.
The Court noted that the fourth amendment indicates a "strong
52. Id. at 2334-36.
53. Id. at 2347 (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2336-37 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted that in determining
whether § 1257(3) prevented the Court from deciding federal constitutional claims raised for
the first time at the Supreme Court's level, it was well established that no particular form of
words or phrases is essential. The claim of invalidity must simply be brought to the attention
of the state court with "fair precision" and in due time.
55. Id. at 2339 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 2342 (White, J., concurring).
57. The Supreme Court has subsequently addressed the good faith issue in two cases
involving a search warrant later determined to be invalid. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.
Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). See supra note 21, infra notes
and accompanying text.
58. See generally, Winter, The Exclusionary Rule, 69 A.B.A.J. 137 (1983); Denniston,
Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered, CAL. LAW., (Apr. 1983) at 40. Both articles predicted that
the two-pronged test would remain intact following Gates. Since the anonymous letter in Gates
would fail to satisfy the test, the articles suggested that the Court would use the good-faith
exception to compensate for the deficiency.
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preference" for searches conducted pursuant to a search warrant.59
By abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of the expanded
totality of circumstances analysis, the Court sought to grant local
magistrates greater flexibility in determining whether or not to issue
a warrant.6 °
The exclusionary rule is invoked by a successful motion to sup-
press evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. By granting
magistrates greater discretion to determine whether there is sufficient
probable cause to issue a warrant, the Court intended to increase the
likelihood that law enforcement officers will obtain a warrant prior
to conducting searches. 61 Since searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant can comport with fourth amendment requirements, the rul-
ing in Gates will make motions to suppress more difficult to sus-
tain.62 In addition, the Court emphasized that reviewing courts
should pay great deference to the magistrate's determination of prob-
able cause,63 and not subject the sufficiency of the affidavit to the
scrutiny of a de novo review.6 '
The controversy surrounding the exclusionary rule centers on
the issue of whether the rule serves to deter police from violating the
fourth amendment,6 5 or whether it instead serves to impede the task
of law enforcement.66 The issue has been the subject of substantial
debate; however, there is little empirical data.6 7
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2331 & n.10.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
61. Id. at 2331. The Court expressed concern that if affidavits were subjected to tough
scrutiny, "police might well resort to warrantless searches" in the hope that consent or some
other exception might develop. Id.
62. Id. The Court noted that "the possession of a warrant ...greatly reduces the
perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct.
63. Id. (citing Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419).
64. 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
65. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prr'r. L. REv. 307, 346 (1982) ("[Elxclusion occurs for the
purpose ...of 'removing the incentive' to disregard the fourth amendment so that 'the fre-
quency of future violations will decrease'."). Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492
(1976)).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2331; see also id. at 2330 n.9.
67. See Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered, supra note 57, at 45-46. "[N]o empirical re-
searcher ...has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deter-
rent effect. ... Id. (quoting the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22
(1976)).
The article describes several studies, including one published in 1979 by the General
Accounting Office, that revealed that fourth amendment problems were the primary reason for
failure to prosecute in less than one half of one percent of unprosecuted federal cases. On the
other hand, Justice White cites similar studies in support of his contention that the exclusion-
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While addressing the issue of whether an anonymous inform-
ant's tip can provide a substantial basis for determining probable
cause, the Court settled some questions, but raised others. The ma-
jority emphasized that although the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged
test has been abandoned, an informant's "basis of knowledge," "ve-
racity," and "reliability" are still relevant considerations.6 8 It may be
assumed that a particular set of facts that would have satisfied the
Aguilar-Spinelli test would clearly meet the Gates totality of circum-
stances test. The question remains, however, whether and to what
degree lower courts will uniformly apply the new doctrine.
The significance of the Court's decision in Gates may have been
temporarily overshadowed by the Court's failure to address the ex-
clusionary rule modification issue. By rejecting the "two-pronged
test" established by Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a totality of circum-
stances analysis, and declaring that the issuing magistrate's decision
was not to be subject to de novo scrutiny by reviewing courts, the
Gates decision further reduced the impact of the exclusionary rule
and allowed the Court to reach the same result as if it had adopted a
good faith exception.69
The Supreme Court has subsequently addressed the exclusion-
ary rule issue if the police officers acted in good faith, 70 and has held
that if officers demonstrate a reasonable, good faith reliance on a
search warrant that is later determined to be invalid, the exclusion-
ary rule will not be applied. The Court concluded that the "margi-
nal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence ob-
ary rule impedes the task of law enforcement. 103 S. Ct. at 2342 n.13 (White, J., concurring).
Recognizing the conflict in the studies, the article suggests that since there appears to be no
reliable information available, the Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that the rule
could be modified with no real harm to fourth amendment rights. Exclusionary Rule Recon-
sidered, supra note 57, at 46.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
69. In Massachusetts v. Upton, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adoption of the total-
ity of the circumstances analysis, declaring that the two-pronged test had been explicitly re-
jected as "hypertechnical" and "divorced from 'the factual and practical considerations of eve-
ryday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.' " Massachusetts v.
Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2087 (1984) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct.
1302 (1949)). As in Gates, Upton involved an informant who had wished to remain anony-
mous. The Court observed that although none of the single pieces of evidence, considered
separately, was conclusive, they "fit neatly together and, so viewed, support[ed] the magis-
trate's determination that there was a 'fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime'
would be found ...." 104 S.Ct. at 2088. The Court thus reaffirmed its acceptance of anony-
mous informants' tips if they were reasonably corroborated to provide a total showing of prob-
able cause.
70. United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.Ct.
3424 (1984).
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tained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion."'"
Because both Leon and Sheppard involved warrants, the ques-
tion may be raised as to whether the Court is likely to apply the
Gates analysis to warrantless searches. In United States v. Ross,"
the Court held that a search conducted pursuant to an exception to
the warrant requirement is not unreasonable if the underlying facts
would have justified the issuance of a warrant, even though a war-
rant was not obtained.73 The question may also be raised as to
whether the Court will extend the good faith exception spelled out in
Leon and Ross to warrantless searches.
Taken together, Ross, Gates, and Leon would seem to provide a
basis for arguing that the exclusionary rule should not be applied if
the officer involved had a good faith belief under the totality of cir-
cumstances that the underlying facts would have justified the issu-
ance of a warrant. If the warrantless search was conducted pursuant
to a tip from an anonymous informant, as in Gates, reasonable cor-
roboration and the application of these three cases may be found suf-
ficient to justify the search.
Even if the Court limits application of the good faith exception
to only searches conducted with warrants, the adoption of the totality
of the circumstances analysis in Gates signifies the Court's continu-
ing intent to lessen the severity of the exclusionary rule.
Jeffrey B. Hare
71. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3421.
72. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Detectives, acting on a reliable informant's tip that a certain
individual was selling narcotics from a certain car and that the narcotics were being kept in the
trunk of the car, stopped and searched the car and trunk and discovered the narcotics in the
trunk.
73. Id. at 809.
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CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-MANDATORY
REGISTRATION OF MISDEMEANANT SEX OFFENDERS
CONVICTED UNDER DISORDERLY CONDUCT STAT-
UTE VIOLATED CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
PROVISION OF CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION-In re
Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
On April 11, 1979, Allen Eugene Reed, an adult homosexual,
entered a public restroom, greeted an undercover vice officer and
briefly masturbated in the officer's presence.' Reed was arrested and
charged with soliciting "lewd and dissolute conduct" from an under-
cover vice officer in a public restroom in violation of Penal Code
section 647(a).'
In a jury trial on January 23, 1980, the defendant was con-
victed of a section 647(a) violation.3 Reed was given a suspended
sentence, fined $630, and put on a twenty-four month probation. He
was also informed of his duty to register as a sex offender under
Penal Code section 290."
Reed appealed the criminal conviction, 5 and filed a writ of
habeas corpus. His writ of habeas corpus was denied by both the
trial court6 and the court of appeals.' Reed then filed a new petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of California. In
In re Reed, the California Supreme Court overturned the lower
© 1984 by Denise M. DeRose.
1. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (Deering 1983) provides: "Every person who commits
any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. (a) Who solicits any-
one to engage in or who engages in lewd or dissolute conduct in any place open to the public
or exposed to public view."
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3. People v. Reed, No. M-9186 (Newhall Dist. Los Angeles Mun. Ct., Jan. 23, 1980).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (Deering 1983); see infra note 14.
5. People v. Reed, 114 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 170 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1980).
6. In re the Application of Thomas F. Coleman, No. 000 095, (Appellate Department,
Los Angeles Super. Ct., April 7, 1981).
7. The unpublished court of appeals decision denied the writ of habeas corpus based on
the doctrine of res judicata. The California Supreme Court in its decision noted that the doc-
trines of law of the case and res judicata did not bar petitioner from relitigating claims rejected
by courts below.
It is axiomatic that habeas corpus is an extraordinary and collateral action that
lies to review a claim of denial of substantive constitutional rights that may have
been affected by the integrity of the factfinding process . . . or a claim that
attacks not the judgment itself, but the legality of the punishment.
33 Cal. 3d at 918 n.2, 663 P.2d at 216 n.2, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 658 n.2 (citations omitted).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
court and held that mandatory registration under section 290 for sex
offenders convicted of section 647(a) misdemeanors violated article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution and was void as cruel or
unusual punishment. As part of the court's decision, the appellant's
probation conditions were ordered changed to eliminate the section
290 registration, and the writ of habeas corpus was finally denied.'
In Reed, the petitioner did not challenge the validity of his con-
viction under section 647(a), nor the entire validity of the require-
ment of section 290 registration of sex offenders. Instead, Reed con-
tended that lifelong section 290 registration for a section 647(a)
misdemeanant constituted "cruel or unusual punishment and vio-
late[d] the equal protection clause, infringe[d] on petitioner's rights
to privacy and interstate travel, and denie[d] [petitioner] due process
of law." 9 However, the Reed court rested its decision entirely on the
constitutional ground prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment."0
The Reed court first examined the history of both section
647(a)11 and section 290. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority,
cited Pryor v. Municipal Court,2 the major opinion defining appli-
8. Id. at 926, 663 P.2d at 223, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66. A California Supreme Court
rehearing was denied on July 25, 1983.
9. Id. at 918, 663 P.2d at 216-17, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59.
10. Reed invoked California's constitutional provision instead of the eighth amendment.
There is a substantive difference between the California provision and the eighth amendment.
California's constitution bans cruel or unusual punishment, while the eighth amendment for-
bids cruel and unusual punishment. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 636, 493 P.2d 880,
885, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1972).
See also Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-federal Ground,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973).
11. The 1955 amended version of section 647(5) provided that "every lewd or dissolute
person . . .[is] a vagrant." 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 169, section 2 at 638-39 (repealed 1961). Since
this version punished people for their status and not their conduct, the California legislature
enacted section 647(a) to replace section 647(5). See People v. Allington, 103 Cal. App. 2d
919-20, 229 P.2d 495, 500-01 (1951). This change made § 647(a) California's first non-com-
mercial sexual solicitation prohibition. See Note, Pryor v. Municipal Court: California's Nar-
rowing Definition of Solicitation for Public Lewd Conduct, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 461, 464-72
(1980).
12. 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
In Pryor the court held the phrase "lewd and dissolute" impermissibly vague and pro-
vided the following construction for the section:
The terms "lewd" and "dissolute" in this section are synonymous and refer to
conduct which involves the touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast
for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, annoyance or offense, if the ac-
tor knows or should know of the presence of persons who may be offended by
this conduct.
Id. at 256-57, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
The Pryor court's rationale for this construction of § 647(a) was not explained. The court
did not disclose why it decided that the enumerated acts are lewd, but recognized that the
underlying purpose of § 647(a) is to protect the unwilling from being forced to view offensive
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cation of section 647(a), and asserted that the Pryor instruction was
the current and proper interpretation of section 647(a).1"
Section 290 describes the mandatory registration procedure
which automatically follows from convictions for certain sex-related
crimes.' 4 The court emphasized that the purpose of section 290 re-
gistration is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumer-
ated in the statute should be readily available for police surveillance
at all times because the legislature deems them to be likely
recidivists. 5
The court then addressed the central issue of the case, does sec-
tion 290 mandatory sex offender registration of section 647(a) misde-
meanants violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel or un-
usual punishment found in article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution ?'
The majority first discussed whether section 290 registration is
a form of punishment within the meaning of this constitutional pro-
conduct. Id. at 255, 599 P.2d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
13. 33 Cal. 3d at 918, 663 P.2d at 217, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
14. Section 290 registration is required for the following sex-related crimes: § 647(d)
(loitering in or about public restrooms); § 266 (procurring females under the age of 18 for
prostitution); § 272 (contribution to the delinquency of a minor); § 288 (lewd and lascivious
conduct with a child under the age of 14); § 288(a) (oral copulation with a minor); § 314(1)
(indecent exposure); § 285 (incest); § 286 (sodomy); § 220 (assault with the intent to commit
rape, sodomy, oral copulation, etc.); and § 216 (forcible rape).
The registration procedure mandated in § 290 requires citizens convicted of the above
listed offenses to register within ten days with the chief of police in each city where they reside.
The offender must provide a signed informational statement, fingerprints, and a photograph
which are sent to the California Department of Justice. Failure to comply is a misdemeanor.
Conviction under the enumerated offenses automatically imposes a lifelong registration obliga-
tion. 33 Cal. 3d at 919, 663 P.2d at 217, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
Pursuant to § 1203.4, an offender may be released from this registration requirement
upon compliance with the statutory conditions. No procedure exists, however, to expunge the
initial registration. Id.; Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 41, 324 P.2d 990, 992
(1958).
Other sex-related crimes exist for which registration is not required: § 311.4 (child por-
nography); § 261.5 (statutory rape); § 281 (bigamy); § 286.5 (bestiality); § 2 7 3g (lewdness in
the presence of a child); § 266d - i (pimping and pandering); and § 647(b) (soliciting and
engaging in acts of prostitution).
15. 33 Cal. 3d at 918, 663 P.2d at 217, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 659 (quoting Barrows v.
Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 825-26, 464 P.2d 483, 485-86, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821-22
(1970)).
See also In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 367, 497 P.2d 807, 811, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335, 339
(1972). The court reasoned that petitioners who sunbathed naked on an isolated stretch of
public beach did not require the constant section 290 police surveillance that would result
automatically from a section 314.1 violation. The court held, therefore, that their actions were
not in violation of section 314.1.
16. 33 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 663 P.2d at 218-19, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
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vision. 17 Rejecting the respondent's distinction between "penalty" as
found in section 1203.4" and "punishment" as found in the consti-
tutional provision, the Reed court noted that these terms do not re-
present two legally different types of punishment. Article I, section
17 of the California Constitution gives standards for measuring the
constitutionality of all penal legislation. The court stated that all
statutory penalties, including those addressed by section 1203.4, must
meet these same constitutional standards. 9
In determining that section 290 registration was a form of pun-
ishment within the constitutional meaning, the justices considered the
multiple factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.20 The enu-
merated Mendoza-Martinez factors include:
1) Whether the challenged sanction involves an affirmative disa-
bility or restraint;
2) Whether the challenged sanction has historically been re-
garded as a punishment;
3) Whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of
scienter;
4) Whether operation of the sanction will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;
5) Whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is al-
ready a crime;
6) Whether an alternative purpose exists to which the chal-
lenged sanction may rationally be connected; and
7) Whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the al-
ternative purpose assigned to it.
The court acknowledged that all of the factors are important,
but that an inquiry into each may lead in different directions. Thus,
the factors are to be considered cumulatively as well as individually.
They are, the court remarked, "a number of relevant considera-
tions," and not a "checklist of absolute requirements."'"
In applying the first prong of the Mendoza-Martinez test, the
17. See supra note 10.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4, in relevant part provides that if a defendant has ful-
filled the conditions of his probation, a court may, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, dismiss the accusation or information against the defendant and relieve him from "all
penalties and disabilities" resulting from the offense for which he has been convicted.
19. 33 Cal. 3d at 919 n.4, 663 P.2d at 218 n.4, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660 n.4.
20. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). This potpourri of factors includes many diverse judi-
cial approaches to determine what is punishment. See Navasky, Deportation as Punishment,
27 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 213 (1959); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punish-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1980).
21. 33 Cal. 3d at 921, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
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court found that section 290 mandatory registration is an "affirma-
tive disability or restraint."22 In reviewing California cases dealing
with the registration statute, the court focused on the vocabulary
used to describe section 290 registration in previous case law.2" The
Reed court reasoned that because past California opinions used
words suggestive of punishment, restraint, and disability in referring
to section 290, the registration must indeed be a punishment.24
Secondly, the majority observed that in as much as the purpose
of sex offender registration was to assure that persons convicted of
certain crimes are readily available for police surveillance, registra-
tion could submit offenders to "command performance at lineups."25
Thus, the effect of the registration was an affirmative disability and
restraint. 26
The court further emphasized the affirmative disability imposed
22. Id. at 920, 663 P.2d at 218, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
It should be noted that the Reed court in finding § 290 an "affirmative disability or
restraint," did not deal with the effect which the registration will have on the individual
petitioner in his particular circumstances. Instead, the court generalized, taking notice only of
the hardship likely to be experienced by all or most § 290 registrants. The court's analysis
omitted any distinguishing personal circumstances which would intensify or lessen this hard-
ship for Reed in particular. In doing so, the Reed court remained as objective as possible and
established a generalized model for lower courts to use in evaluating the first Mendoza-Marti-
nez factor.
23. In Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324 P.2d 990 (1958), the regis-
tration was described as one of the "penalties or disabilities" imposed on certain convicted
misdemeanants. Id. at 41, 324 P.2d at 992 (1958). Here, registration under § 290 was in-
cluded under § 1203.4 as one of the "penalties or disabilities" resulting from the offense or
crime for which the petitioner had been convicted.
In In re Birch, the registration was termed an "ignominious badge carried by the con-
victed sex offender for a lifetime." 10 Cal. 3d 314, 321-22, 515 P.2d 12, 15, 110 Cal. Rptr.
212, 216-17 (1973). In Birch the court vacated a § 647(a) conviction to which the petitioner
had pleaded guilty. The record did not indicate that the defendant/petitioner had been in-
formed either of his right to counsel or the fact that his conviction would require him to
register under § 290 for a lifetime as a sex offender.
24. 33 Cal. 3d at 920, 663 P.2d at 218, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
25. Id. at 921, 663 P.2d at 218, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (quoting Kaus & Mallen, The
Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice", 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1191, 1222 (1974)). Justice Richardson's dissent contests this notion stating that the majority's
scenario of command performance lineups is "frightening but fictional .... Nothing con-
tained in § 290 requires that registrants cooperate with police or attend compulsory police
lineups or otherwise waive their constitutional rights." Id. at 927-28, 663 P.2d at 224, 191
Cal. Rptr. 666. He suggests that any "compulsion or restraint" experienced by § 290 regis-
trants is due not to the registration, but to other factors such as a prior probation condition or
the existence of probable cause. Id.
It could be argued, however, that registration itself, together with the legislature's recidi-
vism assumption, may constitute sufficient probable cause for a fictional scenario like the one
imagined by the majority.
26. Id. at 920, 663 P.2d at 218, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
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by the registration by noting that once initial registration is com-
pleted, no legal mechanism exists to expunge the original registra-
tion.17 Section 1203.4 may be invoked to terminate the requirement
of future registration, but the initial registration is a complete and
unalterable part of the police records in the city where the offense
occurs.
28
In examining the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Reed
court found that the sex offender registration "may not have histori-
cally been regarded as punishment," but that this fact was not dis-
positive. 9 Relying on Trop v. Dulles,"0 the court denied that the
government had the power to devise any punishment within its im-
agination, and asserted that "any technique outside the bounds of
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect."3 The Reed court
asserted that the fact that a sanction does not fall within the histori-
cal definition of punishment indicates not only that the sanction is
punishment, but that it is constitutionally suspect punishment. 2
The Reed court quickly found that section 290 registration sat-
isfied the third, fourth and fifth Mendoza-Martinez factors. The re-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 920-21, 663 P.2d at 218-19, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61; see generally supra
notes 14 and 23 and accompanying text.
Justice Richardson's dissent minimizes the burden of registration stating that § 290 regis-
tration information is only available to police officials and "kept confidential" with "no excep-
tions for employers." Id. at 928, 663 P.2d at 224, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 666 (emphasis in
original).
29. Id. at 921, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
The fact that sex offender registration has not historically been regarded as punishment
should reflect more on the inadequacy of the historical measurement than on the conclusions
drawn from it. Methods of punishment have changed through time, moving from infliction of
physical pain to more abstract deprivations. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH-
MENT 7-22 (1977). Since the notion of acceptable punishment changes with "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958), a test which judges punishment only by looking at the past will be accurate only
when evaluating historically traditional sanctions. The historical approach is of little help in
gray areas such as the one presented in Reed.
30. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31. 33 Cal. 3d at 921, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958)). The punishments termed "traditional penalties" by the Trop
court included "fines, imprisonment and even execution." Id.
32. The reasoning in this analysis, and the one suggested in the court's quotation from
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), skip over an essential step.
The Trop court, in stating that a non-traditional punishment was "constitutionally sus-
pect" meant that it was suspect as cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the constitution.
This assumes, though, that the sanction in question is punishment within the meaning of the
constitution. Given the ambiguity surrounding the characterization of the sanction in Trop, the
Reed court's reliance on Trop and Weems seems misplaced since it utilized these cases in its
analysis of whether § 290 registration is punish.ment and thus subject to evaluation under the
constitutional provision.
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gistration "comes into play only on a finding of scienter,"8" since the
California Supreme Court in Pryor v. Municipal Court"' has con-
strued section 647(a) to require "lewd intent and specific sexual
touching." '3
5
Examining the fourth factor, the Reed court stated that such
registration promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment-deterrence. The legislature enacted section 290 with the in-
tention of deterring recidivism by making past offenders readily
available for police surveillance. 6
The court satisfied the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor by find-
ing that the conduct to which the section 290 registration applies,
section 647(a) violations, was already a criminal offense."
The majority examined the sixth and seventh Mendoza-Marti-
nez factors together. The Reed court found that an alternate non-
punitive purpose for the statute existed, namely as a law enforce-
ment tool. 8 Usually, if a rational connection can be found between a
statute and a non-punitive purpose, the statute will not be held to be
punitive. 9 Here, however, the justices balanced the non-punitive
purpose against the harshness of the statute's effect. The court rea-
soned that even though section 290 registration served a non-punitive
purpose,4 the fact that the registration was an ineffective law en-
forcement tool invalidated this purpose in reference to the Mendoza-
Martinez test. Thus, in light of the statute's harsh effects, the court
found that the registration statute was punitive under the last
33. 33 Cal. 3d at 922, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (quoting Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168).
34. 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
35. 33 Cal. 3d at 921-22, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
36. See Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 825-26, 464 P.2d 483, 485-86, 83
Cal. Rptr. 819, 821-22 (1970). Note that the Reed court addresses only the deterrence issue as
a "traditional aim of punishment," and not deterrence and retribution as does the Court in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 33 Cal. 3d at 920, 663 P.2d at
218, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660. California has expressly rejected retribution as a legitimate objec-
tive of criminal punishment. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 651, 493 P.2d 880, 896, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 168 (1972). It is, therefore, correctly omitted from the Reed analysis.
37. 33 Cal. 3d at 921-22, 663 P.2d at 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
38. Id. at 922, 663 P.2d at 219-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
39. Id. This rational relation criterion was applied in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960). There, a section of the Social Security Act was challenged as retrospective punish-
ment, void under the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. The section terminated old
age benefits to aliens for a list of specific reasons. The Court reasoned that if a rational connec-
tion could be found between the statute and a non-punitive purpose, the statute would not be
considered punitive and thus not violative of the ex post facto clause.
40. See Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 922 n.7, 663 P.2d at 219 n.7, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661 n.7 for
a discussion of the inefficiency of § 290 registration as a law enforcement tool.
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factor.41
After its survey of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the
Reed court concluded that section 290 sex offender registration was a
form of punishment within the meaning of article I, section 17 of the
California Constitution.4
The court's second major line of analysis explored whether arti-
cle I section 17 was violated by requiring section 290 sex offender
registration of section 647(a) misdemeanants. The court began by
noting that the definition for what constitutes cruel or unusual pun-
ishment is a "flexible and progressive standard,"4 which acquires
new meaning as society becomes more "enlightened" and "hu-
mane.'"" The Reed court applied the proportionality test for deter-
mining cruel or unusual punishment, which was developed and ex-
plicated in In re Lynch.4
5
In adopting this proportionality standard, the Reed court ap-
plied the three techniques outlined in Lynch for determining what
constitutes gross disproportionality between a crime and its punish-
ment. The court examined (1) the nature of the offense and/or of-
fender with special regard to the degree of danger both present to
41. Id. at 923, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
42. Id. at 922, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 923, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)). This refers to the historical development of the concept of cruel
and unusual punishment, from an early prohibition of physical torture, O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 337-39 (1892) (Stevens J., dissenting); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436-47 (1890);
Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 408-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893), to the modern view that
punishment should be evaluated in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
45. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 162, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
The proportionality standard is derived from Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892), later adopted by the majority in Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, a government official was convicted in the Philippines for making
two false entries in his cash book. The Philippine statute for this offense required a minimum
sentence of 12 years imprisonment in chains with hard and painful labor in addition to fines,
loss of civil liberties and perpetual surveillance. The Court held both that the methods used
were cruel and unusual, and that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted, and thus also cruel and unusual. Id. at 377.
The California courts adopted this standard in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), recognizing that "punishments of excessive severity for
ordinary offenses may be both cruel and unusual." Id. at 654, 493 P.2d at 897, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 169. A few months after the Anderson holding, the court in In re Lynch held that a life
sentence was not a cruel or unusual method of imposing punishment, but that a life sentence
was cruel and unusual because it was "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." 8 Cal. 3d
410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226. Thus, disproportionality between crime
and punishment became another constitutional avenue for challenging punishment.
1984] IN RE REED
society;"' (2) the challenged penalty as compared with those imposed
in the same jurisdiction for more serious crimes; and (3) the chal-
lenged penalty as compared with those imposed for the same offense
in different jurisdictions.4 7
In applying the first of the Lynch techniques, the court ex-
amined the nature of the offense and found the defendant's infraction
minor by contemporary standards.' The court remarked that even
common-place actions performed in a public place when accompa-
nied by the requisite touching may suffice for a section 647(a) con-
viction.49 The court bolstered its notion of changing contemporary
standards by noting that a 1975 statute5" had made homosexual ac-
tivity by itself no longer criminal.51
The Reed court next examined the degree of danger present to
society in section 647(a) violations and noted that there are usually
no victims of this crime.5 2 The court pointed out that Pryor required
that an offender know or have reason to know that someone might
be offended by his conduct.5 The Reed court concluded that this
"offended person" requirement did not suggest that a section 647(a)
46. 8 Cal. 3d at 425-26, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
In analyzing the nature of the offense and offender, the Lynch court examined many
factors: 1) the facts of the case demonstrating the triviality of the crime; 2) the effect of the
crime-whom it injured and whom it benefitted; 3) whether the crime was violent or non-
violent; 4) whether the crime was victimless; and 5) whether there were rational gradations of
culpability that could be made on the basis of the injury to the victim or society in general. Id.
In In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974), the California
Supreme Court added another consideration to the analysis, namely was the challenged pun-
ishment consistent with the penalogical ends of rehabilitation, deterrence, and isolation of dan-
gerous offenders from society. Id. at 916, 519 P.2d at 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
See also Grajewski, Prohibiting Cruel or Unusual Punishment: California's Require-
ment of Proportionate Sentencing after Wingo and Rodriquez, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 524, 549
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Proportionate Sentencing].
47. 33 Cal. 3d at 923, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (quoting and summariz-
ing from In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 425-29, 503 P.2d at 930-33, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-29).
48. 33 Cal. 3d at 923, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
49. Id. The triviality of the offense for which § 647(a) conviction is appropriate bears
out this notion. See In re Anders, 25 Cal. 3d 414, 599 P.2d 1364, 158 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1979)(petitioner masturbated in private, enclosed pay toilet); In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d
12, 10 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973) (petitioner urinated against parking lot retaining wall late at
night after he was refused use of Taco Bell restroom which had been cleaned for the day);
People v. Rodriquez, 63 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 3, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1976) (two men arrested
for hugging and kissing in parked car in early morning).
50. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 71 and 877 at 144 and 2246.
51. But see People v. Rodriquez, 63 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, Supp. 5, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765,
767 (1976), where the court remarked that invidious discrimination did not exist in a § 647(a)
conviction even though the officer who arrested two males found hugging and kissing testified
that he would probably not have arrested a heterosexual couple doing the same.
52. 33 Cal. 3d at 923, 663 P.2d at 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
53. Id. (citing Pryor, 25 Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340).
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overture was dangerous to either a specific observer or to society at
large. This point was further reinforced by the fact that in most con-
victions of this sort, the requisite "offended party" is a single under-
cover vice officer. Thus, there is no victim in the traditional sense."'
In its analysis of the nature of the offender and the danger to
society, the court next analyzed the specific facts55 of the Reed case
and found both the petitioner's offense and typical section 647(a) of-
fenses to be minor.56 The Reed court also examined the petitioner as
an individual, characterizing him as a stable adult homosexual with
no prior arrest history. Thus, the court found that the petitioner
posed no grave threat to society, either in his person or by his action;
rather he had exhibited a "relatively simple sexual indiscretion." 57
54. 33 Cal. 3d at 923-24 n.9, 663 P.2d at 220-21 n.9, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63 n.9
(citing Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Emperical Study of En-
forcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 647, 698 (1966)).
The study further clarified the victimless aspect of Y 647(a) crimes, stating that complaints to
police regarding lewd solicitation are infrequent, and therefore any relationships between com-
plaints and later arrests is indirect. Rarely does a specific complaint from an offended victim
result in the arrest of that specific violator. More often arrests are made by undercover vice
officers whose presence substitutes as the requisite "offended party." But see People v. Reed,
114 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, Supp. 4, 170 Cal. Rptr. 770, 771 (1980) (discussion of officer as
offended party in early appeal of this case).
55. The court also pointed out a significant conflict of evidence at the trial level. Con-
trary to the undercover officer's assertion, petitioner denied that he had solicited the officer. It
is agreed, however, that the petitioner masturbated in the officer's presence. 33 Cal. 3d at 924,
663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 663. Although not noted in the supreme court opinion, an
early appeal of Reed's criminal conviction stated that the defendant had made some effort to
hide his activities from others who entered the restroom. This is presented as an unsuccessful
argument against the Pryor "offended person" requirement. In Pryor the petitioner argued
that the officer, who was the only witness, "tried to give the appearance that he was not
offended. ... People v. Reed, 114 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, Supp. 4, 170 Cal. Rptr. 770, 771-
72 (1980).
56. See supra note 49; Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 425, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226
(analysis of Lynch facts in this context); see also, 6 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 416, 419 n.25 (1973)
(listing factual analysis regarding cruel and/or unusual punishment examination).
57. 33 Cal. 3d at 924, 663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 662. Both the Reed and the
Lynch courts, in considering the nature of the offense and/or offender, discuss the petitioner as
an individual-his background, job, marital history, familial circumstances, prior police record,
etc. Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 503 P.2d at 939-40, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36. Mindful of this
contingency, a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus has two options in challenging his punish-
ment as cruel or unusual under the proportionality standard. He can argue that his sentence is
invalid either because the law under which it was imposed is unconstitutional in all circum-
stances, or because the sentence as applied to him specifically and individually is not appropri-
ate. If the latter determination is made, the court will be declaring the statute itself constitu-
tionally valid, but its application to the particular defendant disproportionate because of
specific elements in the defendant's personal history, police record or the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime.
The distinction between a ruling that sustains a statutory penalty, but holds it excessive in
application to a specific defendant and one which overturns statutory penalties found dispro-
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In final examination of a section 647(a) offender's danger to
society, the Reed court distinguished the petitioner's narrow claim
that from the assertion raised in People v. Mills, section 647(a) mis-
demeanants cannot be presumed dangerous sex offender recidivists
deserving of the permanent police surveillance intended under section
290.58 In Mills, the court rejected the defendant's assertion that sex
offenders per se are not recidivists and hence should not come under
the section 290 purview.59 Thus, in all aspects of the first Lynch
examination technique, the justices found the nature of the offense
and the offender not to be dangerous to society.
The Reed court next applied the second Lynch inquiry tech-
nique, an intrastate comparison. Using the intrastate comparison
technique, the court compared penalties imposed in California for
more serious crimes with the challenged penalty for a section 647(a)
violation.60 The court developed three arguments in finding the sec-
tion 290 registration requirement disproportionate: (1) arguably
more serious sex-related misdemeanors do not require registration;
(2) other sex-related criminals who could benefit from police surveil-
lance are not required to register; and (3) serious felonies not related
to sex do not require registration."
In addressing the first argument, the court listed several "argua-
bly more serious sex-related misdemeanors" which do not require
registration.6" In measuring the seriousness of the crimes compared
portionate to any defendant is explored in Corrigan, California's Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating
Sentences After In re Lynch, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 636, 645-48 (1974). This article asserts that
in California, attacks on sentences are more often successful when they maintain the law to be
unconstitutional under all circumstances, rather than as applied to only a specific defendant.
Id.
58. 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1978).
59. 33 Cal. 3d at 924, 663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (summarizing People v.
Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 177, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 411). In Mills, the defendant was charged
with a § 288 violation, a felony. As a defense, he challenged the application of § 290 to all sex
related crimes which trigger its sanctions. See supra note 14 for list of sex related crimes
which automatically trigger § 290, and those which do not.
60. 33 Cal. 3d at 924, 663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The Lynch court asserted
that the legislature should be depended on to act with due and deliberate regard for constitu-
tional restraints in prescribing the vast majority of punishments set forth in its own statutes.
Id. (quoting from Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231). Assuming
this is true, if a court finds that crimes which appear more serious are punished less severely
than the challenged penalty, the challenged penalty must be constitutionally suspect. 33 Cal.
3d at 924, 663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
61. 33 Cal. 3d at 925, 663 P.2d at 221-22, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
62. See supra note 14 for list of crimes not requiring § 290 registration.
Although the court did not reveal the standards by which it measured these crimes "more
serious," some helpful generalizations may be drawn from the nature of the list itself.
Although the court introduced its list with the label "more serious sex related misdemean-
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with section 647(a), the Reed court considered the element of coer-
cion of the victim by the offender. Many of the crimes that the court
listed as "arguably more serious" than section 647(a) involved abuse
of power or status between persons of unequal physical, mental or
socio-economic stature.6 3 Reed's crime involved neither coercion nor
a powerless victim; yet, offenders are required to register. Reed's re-
gistration under this measurement seemed disproportionate to the
crime.
The court next argued that one purpose of section 290 registra-
tion, easy police surveillance to discourage recidivism, is more suita-
ble as a deterrent for other crimes if registration is not required. The
court pointed out that prostitution, a section 647(b) violation, is not
subject to the section 290 registration penalty, but that prostitution is
more likely to be repeated than are section 647(a) violations which
require registration."' The suggestion underlying this statement is
that if the legislature did not see fit to impose section 290 registration
for crimes and criminals inclined to recidivism by the nature of their
offense, then the imposition of section 290 registration on less likely
recidivists, like section 647(a) offenders, is constitutionally suspect as
being disproportionate.
The state's counter-argument did not persuade the court. The
ors," most of the crimes listed are actually felonies under the California Penal Code. The
pimping and pandering crimes (§§ 266d - 266i) are all felonies, as are subdivisions (b) and (c)
of § 311.4, prohibiting the use of a known minor for child pornography. Only § 311.4(a), the
use of a known minor for sale and distribution of pornography, is a misdemeanor. Addition-
ally, the court lists rape (§ 264), which is a felony in any form. The court, it appears, was
using the legal distinctions between felony and misdemeanor in judging the listed crimes "more
serious." Since the sex related felonies listed did not require § 290 registration, while § 647(a),
a misdemeanor, did, the court found the § 290 requirement disproportionate and therefore
constitutionally suspect. 33 Cal. 3d at 924, 663 P.2d at 221, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
63. The sex-related crimes that the court listed as "more serious" than § 647(a) involved
perpetrators who were more powerful, committing crimes against powerless or innocent per-
sons such as incompetents, minors, or individuals otherwise dependent on the offender.
For "more serious" crimes perpetrated against minors, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 309 (ad-
mitting or keeping a minor in a house of prostitution); § 311.4 (employment of a minor for
distribution of obscene matter or production of pornography); § 17 3g (lewd conduct in the
presence of a child) (Deering 1983).
For "more serious" crimes committed against incompetents, see CAL. PENAL CODE §
261(1) (rape of incapable person); § 261(3) (rape of incapacitated person); § 261(4) (rape of
unconscious person); § 261(5) (rape of deceived person); § 261(6) (rape of threatened person)
(Deering 1983).
For "more serious" crimes committed against individuals otherwise dependent on the of-
fender, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 266d (receipt of money for placing person in custody for
purpose of cohabitation); § 266e (payment for prostitution or placing another in an immoral
house); § 266f (selling person for immoral purpose); § 266g (placing one's wife in house of
prostitution); § 266i (pandering) (Deering 1983).
64. 33 Cal. 3d at 925, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
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respondent attempted to mitigate the disproportionality between sec-
tion 647(a) violations which require registration, and section 647(b)
violations which do not. Respondent noted that prostitution could be
regulated under section 647(a) or (b)." This suggested that section
290 registration of prostitutes, likely recidivists, under section 647(a)
constituted a sound reason for maintaining the registration require-
ment for all section 647(a) offenses. The court rejected this reason-
ing, pointing out that in practical terms, section 647(b) would more
likely be utilized.66
The Reed court finally demonstrated the relative severity of the
challenged punishment by observing that "[miore serious crimes not
related to sex, such as robbery, burglary and arson do not require
registration." 7 The court again pointed out the disproportionality in
California between punishment for felonies with victims, which ter-
minates at the end of the prison term, and punishment for the vic-
timless section 647(a) offense for which the "misdemeanant must
carry the onus of sex offender registration for a lifetime.""
The third Lynch proportionality technique utilized by the Reed
court was a comparison of the challenged penalty with penalties im-
posed in different jurisdictions for the same offense, an interjurisdic-
tional comparison.69 The court first pointed out the infrequency with
which cities and states enact statutes or ordinances similar to section
65. Sections 647(a) and (b) provide:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor:
(a) Who solicits anyone to engage in or who engages in lewd or dissolute
conduct in any public place or in any place exposed to the public view.
(b) Who solicits or who engages in any act of prostitution . . . includ[ing]
any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a)-(b) (Deering 1983).
66. 33 Cal. 3d at 925, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The assumption behind the Lynch interjurisdictional comparison is simply that mostjurisdictions will have prescribed punishment within Constitutional boundaries. Thus, exami-
nation of statutes interjurisdictionally will create a constitutional standard against which the
penalty challenged in California may be measured. Id. See also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,
427, 503 P.2d 921, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228 (1972).
A problem may arise in application of this technique stemming from differences in vari-
ous state constitutions. The doctrine of independent state grounds allows a state to base its
decision or statute on state constitutions. These constitutions vary and may legitimately offer
more protection than the Federal Constitution does. Falk, The State Constitution, A More
than "Adequate" Non Federal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1973). This sliding
constitutional scale must be considered to discern whether the particular states examined ex-
tend greater or lesser protection than California does, and how this constitutional variation
affects the issue under examination.
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290.70 As a second step, the justices discussed existing similar stat-
utes in comparison with the section 647(a) penalty of registration.
The court found California's statute to be the most severe.
7 1
Using the three Lynch techniques, the Reed court concluded
that the penalty of the lifelong stigma of sex offender registration
was "out of all proportion to the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted."'7 2 The court then held that section 290 registration for
section 647(a) violators was unconstitutional under article I, section
17 of the California Constitution.73
Reed delineates the proper scope and application of the Lynch
test. Lynch held that a statutory penalty that is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the crime committed violates the California constitution
provision against "cruel or unusual punishment. ' 74 The Lynch rul-
ing, therefore, provided a new foundation for habeas corpus appeals
to challenge seemingly harsh penalties." Subsequent California Su-
preme Court decisions shifted the focus of the Lynch proportionality
doctrine, however, softening the collision between the courts and the
California legislature. 76 With the passage of the Uniform Determi-
70. "Only four states require registration for serious sex offenses, not including disor-
derly conduct. Only 13 cities of the 384 surveyed had sex offender registration laws." 33 Cal.
3d at 925, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664; see R. DOCKER & L. KAMMLER, CRIMI-
NAL REGISTRATION STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES (1963).
71. By comparison, the court found that in 1978 Arizona repealed a similar law; that
Nevada's law is limited to felonies, while § 647(a) is misdemeanor; that Ohio's law is likewise
limited to felonies, but also requires prior sex crime conviction before registration is invoked;
and that the Massachusetts statute is less stringent in its requirements, demanding only that
registrants notify authorities about the institution from which they have been released. Id. at
925, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
72. 33 Cal. 3d at 926, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
73. Id.
74. Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
75. The Lynch holding, especially the comparative Lynch techniques, for a time forced
open prison doors. Offenders, taking advantage of the inconsistencies in California's statutory
penalties, brought habeas corpus writs to challenge disproportionality between the maximum
statutory penalty and the crime. See In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1974); In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); In re
Jones, 35 Cal. App. 3d 531, 110 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1973); Cassou & Taugher, Determinate
Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 11 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Numbers Game].
76. Before 1977, the California courts sentenced defendants to prison for "the term pre-
scribed by law" but not for a definite number of years. The actual sentence was made by the
Adult Authority. Under Lynch the court decided to utilize the statutory maximum in evaluat-
ing the proportionality of punishment to crime. This was an unrealistic decision since the
statutory maximum was seldom the actual sentence, and even less frequently the actual time
served. In California, a defendant sentenced under a constitutionally valid statute is not enti-
tled to individual relief. People v. Olson, 173 Cal. App. 2d 535, 537, 343 P.2d 379, 380
(1959). Thus, any finding of disproportionality between a statutory maximum punishment and
the actual crime committed forced the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional on its
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nate Sentencing Act of 1976,"' the legislature limited the discretion
of the judiciary by enacting statutory guidelines to assure uniformity
of sentences among offenders who commit the same offense under
similar circumstances.78 Lynch relied on disproportionality between
statutory maximums and the individual petitioner's crime. Because
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act forces the court to tailor
the individual sentence to the individual facts of the crime, the Pan-
dora's box of statutory invalidation opened by Lynch seems to have
been closed.7 9
Where, then, is the proper place for the Lynch test as resur-
rected in In re Reed? Reed illustrates the usefulness of the Lynch
test for penalties other than imprisonment, such as fines, denial of
rights and imposition of additional duties.8" The Lynch test may also
be invoked to challenge sections of the California Penal Code not
affected by the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, such as misde-
meanant sentencing, alternative dispositions for felonies, and sentenc-
ing of the most serious felonies.81 Further, Reed clearly illustrates
that the Lynch test will serve as a stimulus to the legislature to re-
consider its present piecemeal system of penalties. It will also serve
as an effective tool in preventing or correcting future legislative en-
actments that vault penalties for highly visible and notorious crimes
out of proportion with crimes of equal seriousness in response to
face. Inevitably, this led to much activity in the courts as statutory penalties were challenged.
In People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975), the court side-
stepped this conundrum by holding that the proportionality of a statutory penalty is to be
evaluated against the actual term fixed by the Adult Authority, rather than against the statu-
tory maximum. Id. at 182, 534 P.2d at 1011, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Thus, after Wingo,
determination of disproportionality often allowed the statutory penalty established by the legis-
lature to stand, while invalidating the Adult Authority term. See also In re Rodriquez, 14 Cal.
3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
77. See § 350 of Senate Bill 42 of the 1975-1976 session of the legislature (Stats. 1976,
Ch. 1139) (codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 as added, § 1168 as amended, Article I of
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with § 1170) as added, § 12022 as amended, § 12022.5 as amended,
§ 12022.6 as added and § 12022.7 as added).
78. Apart from imposing a consecutive sentence, imposing an upper or lower term, or
striking enhancements, courts are given no real discretion to set terms based on the widely
varying culpability involved in the human conduct we denote as criminal. The prison and
parole authorities that once had such a power have it no longer. See Numbers Game, supra
note 75, at 105.
79. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, Computing a Determinate Sentence . . . New Math Hits
the Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 604 (1976).
80. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 44010 (West 1983), for example, which provides for the revo-
cation of teaching certificates for persons convicted under § 647(a), may be subject to a Lynch
test challenge.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 128, 190.1, 190.3, 209, 218, 219 and 4500 (Deering 1983);
see also Numbers Game, supra note 75, at 22.
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public demands for harsher penalties. The Reed decision illustrates
that the Lynch test, a controversial and valuable tool in monitoring
punishment, has been tempered but not buried.
Perhaps more important in the Reed decision is the standard of
judicial review Reed suggests for proportionality decisions. Gener-
ally, the constitutionality of legislation has been determined by appli-
cation of one of two tests: the rational basis test or the compelling
state interest test."2 The rational basis test determines whether the
legislation bears a rational relation to a legitimate end. Courts using
the rational basis test will usually "uphold legislation if any justifica-
tion, however feeble, may be suggested." 8 The compelling state in-
terest test, on the other hand, is used when legislation affects a fun-
damental right or a suspect class, and determines whether the law is
indispensable in achieving a compelling state goal.84 To satisfy this
stringent test, a state must establish that its goal is not only legiti-
mate and compelling, but also that it has employed the least restric-
tive means possible to attain its legislative end. 5
The Reed court does not appear to follow either judicial stan-
dard. The judicial hypothesizing often found in support of a statute
when courts use the rational basis test is absent in Reed. Indeed, the
court rejected the "feeble" reasons' offered by the state which would
usually suffice in application of the rational basis test. The court also
questioned the efficacy of the section 290 sex offender registration
instead of simply accepting it as the state's justification for the stat-
ute.87 The Reed court's omission of the rational basis standard set
forth in Lynch 8 evinces that Reed does not adhere to the rational
basis test.
The Reed court also did not utilize the compelling state interest
test. Nowhere are the words "compelling state interest" used in the
82. See Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 93 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as The Supreme Court 1968 Term]; Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court 1971 Term].
83. See Proportionate Sentencing, supra note 46, at 545.
84. The Supreme Court 1968 Term, supra note 82, at 93.
85. See generally Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
86. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (court rejects state's argument that
prostitutes could be arrested under § 647(a)).
87. 33 Cal. 3d at 922 n.7, 663 P.2d at 219-20 n.7, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62 n.7.
88. The standard offered in Lynch is as follows: "Here as in other contexts mere doubt
does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes must be upheld
unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears." 8 Cal. 3d 410,
414-15, 503 P.2d 921, 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (1972) (citations omitted).
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decision nor are the petitioner's interests, with which section 290 in-
terferes, termed "fundamental." 8 Although the petitioner's com-
plaint addressed the issue of his right to privacy, the Reed court's
disposition of the case on the cruel or unusual punishment grounds
does not reach this potential substantive due process issue.90
Justice Richardson criticized the court's failure to adhere to a
rational basis standard in his dissent. He rephrased the standard that
had been consistently used in appraising the constitutionality of stat-
utes. "Legislation is presumed to be constitutional and must be up-
held unless its invalidity 'clearly, positively and unmistakably' ap-
pears.""' Richardson stated that instead of presuming the
constitutionality of the statute in question, the court presumed facts
supporting the invalidity of section 290. He developed his argument
by showing where the court theorized and inferred facts to invalidate
the statute rather than uphold it.92
Justice Kraus, in his brief dissent, also faulted the majority on
the same issue. Both dissenting justices questioned the appropriate-
ness of the Reed court's analysis, noting that it does not fit within the
confines of a rational basis standard.
The proportionality challenge in Reed should perhaps be judg-
ed under the standard of judicial review termed the "intensified ra-
tional basis model."9" The court demands reasonable arguments
from both sides. The intensified rational basis model places the state
and the petitioner on more equal footing than does the slanting
ground of either the rational basis test or the compelling state inter-
est standard. Because the compelling state interest standard would
likely result in a massive undoing of criminal penalties if applied in
proportionality examinations, and because the rational basis stan-
89. The petitioner, a homosexual, is arguably a member of a "discrete and insular mi-
nority," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 204 U.S. 144 n.10 (1938), deserving of the
special solicitude of the judicial branch via utilization of the compelling state interest test.
Studies indicate that the vast majority of § 647(a) arrests are of male homosexuals. Pryor v.
Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d at 252, 599 P.2d at 644, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
See Proportionate Sentencing, supra note 46, at 556-57 (arguments made for and against
application of the rational basis and compelling state interest tests in the area of determining
proportionality of sentences).
90. 33 Cal. 3d at 918 n.3, 663 P.2d at 217 n.3, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 659 n.3.
91. 33 Cal. 3d at 927, 663 P.2d at 223, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
92. Id. at 927-30, 663 P.2d at 223-25, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 665-67.
Justice Richardson examines the majority's presentation of facts regarding their premises
and finds all of these facts to be unsupported by the record. He faults the majority's assertions
that § 290 involves substantial "compulsion and restraint," that the section is directed toward
"relatively minor" offenders, and that it is not an effective law enforcement tool. Id.
93. See generally The Supreme Court 1971 Term, supra note 82, at 18.
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dard would result in rubber stamp approval of most statutory penal-
ties, the intensified rational basis model seems the most appropriate
in judging the proportionality of penalties. A more clearly defined
explanation of this standard is required, however, if courts are to
utilize it effectively in proportionality examinations.
CONCLUSION
Reed has firmly established the Mendoza-Martinez factors in
California law as the composite test for determining what is punish-
ment and the Lynch technique for inquiring whether a dispropor-
tionality exists between a crime and its punishment.
Reed, through application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors,
held that section 290 registration of section 647(a) offenders is pun-
ishment in the constitutional sense. In discussing whether the sanc-
tion involved an affirmative disability or restraint, the Reed court
pursued a generalized analysis rather than one that focused specifi-
cally on the individual petitioner. The court's use of the historical
Mendoza-Martinez factors led to the conclusion that section 290 was
a constitutionally suspect punitive measure. The court found that all
of the other Mendoza-Martinez factors, considered separately and
collectively, indicated that section 290 was a punishment within the
constitutional meaning.
Under the Lynch proportionality analysis, the Reed court found
the nature of the section 647(a) offense/offender to be a minor dan-
ger. Under the intrajurisdictional comparison inquiry, other more
serious crimes in California were found to be punished less severely.
Under the interjurisdictional comparison, California's statute was
found to be the most severe of a group of similar statutes from other
states. This analysis resulted in the Reed court holding that section
290 registration for section 647(a) misdemeanants was cruel or un-
usual punishment because the punishment was found to be grossly
disproportionate to the crime.
As is illustrated in Reed, the Lynch test maintains a place in
assuring the proportionality between crime and punishment, even af-
ter being tempered by the cases which followed it. Reed further sug-
gests that the standard of review to be applied in California exami-
nations of proportionality is the intensified rational basis model, an
appropriate one for the aims of the proportionality analysis, but one
which requires a clearer statement by the California courts.
Denise M. DeRose
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